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Do Warrants Matter?
Abstract: We examine traditional criminal wiretaps to determine whether the 4th

Amendment's warrant requirement limits law enforcement. We develop a formal
model relating law enforcement's decision to pursue a wiretap to its exogenous
cost, probability of yielding evidence, and the expected value of that evidence.
We use the model to analyze success rates of all traditional federal wiretaps
initiated 1997-2004. We find budget constraints cause law enforcement to
pursue only taps that are particularly likely to succeed. Thus, eliminating the
warrant requirement for traditional wiretaps would matter little, and the significance of a warrant requirement for new investigative programs, such as the
Terrorist Surveillance Program, depends on budget.
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Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping
devices.
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967)

In December 2005, the New York Times revealed that the US Government has
been engaged in an extensive, previously undisclosed program of electronic
surveillance, installing warrantless wiretaps on some telephone calls believed
to involve terrorist activity. 1 While the legality of the program remains a subject
of much debate, 2 the empirical question raised is whether the warrantless nature

1 See Risen and Lichtblau (2005). Copies of the Department of Justice's legal defense of the NSA
wiretapping program are available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/nsa/foia/.
2 In the wake of the disclosure of the warrantless wiretapping program, Congress has enacted
two major statutory changes to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). First, in 2007,
Congress adopted the Protect America Act, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552, which broadly
allowed warrantless wiretaps targeting individuals (including United States citizens) located
overseas. The United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review concluded that
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of these programs actually affects law enforcement behavior. Does a warrant
requirement restrict the nature and scope of law enforcement investigations? Or,
is there already some other limiting factor that prevents law enforcement from
pursuing wiretaps where it would not be able to satisfy the probable cause
standard that would be necessary to obtain a warrant?
Success rates of wiretaps, in particular, have received little attention in the
legal literature, but prior studies of traditional search warrants suggest warrants
might matter. For instance, searches without warrants succeed at a far lower rate
than searches with warrants. Random car stops, almost all of which occur
without a warrant, recover evidence only 11.?o/o of the time (Durose, 2005); in
contrast, searches with warrants recover evidence at rates exceeding 80o/o or
90o/o (Benner and Samarkos, 2000; van Duziend, 1984). Recent debate in the
legal literature has focused on the value of requiring judges to explicitly incoporate these differential success rates into the probable cause determination
(Minzner, 2009; Lerner, 2006; Rosenthanl, 2005). The presence or absence of a
warrant, though, may not be the only difference between searches with and
without a warrant. For instance, less capable officers might initiate car stop
searches or car stops may be cheaper for law enforcement and thus used more
aggressively. These factors would decrease success rates compared with traditional warranted searches. A similar dynamic may exist in the wiretap context.
The decision to tap a device depends on many factors, such as agents' tapping
experience, the costs of the tap, the law enforcement benefits from executing the
tap, all of which might increase or decrease the probability of recovering
evidence independent of the warrant requirement.
To understand the role of these factors, we introduce a conceptual model
that takes the legal restraints as exogenous in order to test the constraints on
law enforcement behavior in the real world. We presume law enforcement
officers are utility-maximizing agents subject to both the probable cause constraint arising out of the warrant requirement and a budget constraint. The
model suggests that if warrants are the limiting factor on law enforcement
behavior, average success rates are misleading. Instead, it is the marginal, i.e.
least likely to succeed, wiretap that reveals the factors limiting behavior. If
this type of warrantless wiretap complied with the requirements of the United States
Constitution. See In Re: Directives Pursuant to Section 105 B of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/newsroom/2009/FISCR_Opinion.pdf.
The PAA expired in February 2008 and in the summer of 2008, Congress passed the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436. The 2008 Amendments provided
immunity for suit for the telecommunication companies participating in the warrantless wiretapping program and again modified the FISA warrant requirements. For a full discussion of
the current legal requirements under FISA, see Kris and Wilson (2008).
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warrants are the limiting factor, we would expect the marginal wiretap to
recover evidence at something approaching the statistical definition of probable
cause. On the other hand, if wiretaps succeed at the margin more often than a
probable cause limitation would suggest, some other factor must constrain
agent behavior and ensure that only individuals who are very likely to be
engaging in criminal activity are pursued.
We apply the model to test whether the warrant process actually limits
investigations by considering the success rate of traditional federal criminal
wiretaps obtained between 1998 and 2004. Using two measures of success:
(1) whether the wiretap led to the interception of what the supervising agent
believed to be an incriminating communication and (2) whether the wiretap led
to an arrest, we find warrants, even at the margin, are far more successful than
the probable cause standard would predict. Even the riskiest wiretaps in the
data set recover evidence far more frequently than the probable cause standard
requires. Thus, it appears that the judicial review of wiretap applications is not
the limiting factor in investigating criminal activity and presents the question of
what does constrain law enforcement, and whether it accurately reflects the
social value of evidence recovered.
This conclusion raises the question of why wiretaps are so successful. Legal
academics have proposed three alternative explanations for high average success rates of traditional warranted searches. First, searches may be easy. If
criminal activity is commonplace, even borderline searches are extremely likely
to recover evidence (Duke, 1986). Second, judges could be?-inadvertently or
ideologically?-systematically imposing a higher evidentiary standard than probable cause. Third, law enforcement might self-impose a standard higher than
that commonly associated with probable cause. For instance, law enforcement
might self-limit out of fear of later suppression, institutional or budgetary
reasons (Dripps, 1986a, 1986b).
Each of these different theories suggests different predictions about the
success rates of wiretaps. If searches are easy, we should see variation based
on the level of criminal activity in the judicial district. If judges are the binding
constraint, we should see variation based on judicial characteristics. If institutional constraints imposed uniformly by the Department Justice (discussed in the
next section) restrain wiretap use, we should not see district-level variation.
Finally, if budget constraints are the limiting factor, the cost of the wiretap
should matter.
Our analysis suggests that wiretaps are so successful because law enforcement allocates scarce budget resources only to wiretaps that are very likely to
succeed. Not only are more expensive wiretaps more successful, districts that
install more wiretaps are less effective on the margin. As a result, the value of a
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warrant requirement turns on the law enforcement budget constraint. For traditional criminal investigations, we believe that wiretaps are substantially underfunded, as law enforcement is not pursuing socially desirable wiretaps. Second,
if and only if terrorism investigators have far more resources at their disposal
than traditional law enforcement will a warrant requirement affect the investigations that are carried out.
The rest of the article is organized as followed. Section I provides essential
background and introduces the formal model. Section II provides a description
of the data set we analyze. Section III presents the regression results. Section IV
concludes with a discussion of the ramifications of these results.

1 Modeling the warrant requirement
Wiretaps are a specialized type of search warrant, which the Supreme Court has
held are subject to the requirements and remedies of the Fourth Amendment
[Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967)]. To obtain a tap warrant, the investigating agent and an Assistant United
States Attorney (AUSA) complete a wiretap affidavit, which is then submitted to
the Office of Enforcement Operations at the Department of Justice (OEO). An
OEO attorney evaluates the package and suggests changes. The standard
applied by OEO is commonly thought to be stricter than judicial probable
cause, as they require specific evidence of a "dirty call" on the line within the
last few weeks. This requirement can be met if the target phone has contact with
another device already being intercepted but is more commonly accomplished
by having a confidential informant place a call to the phone and engage in
conversation of a criminal nature. After the OEO attorney is satisfied with the
application, it is sent to a Deputy Attorney General for signature. Only then may
the wiretap be submitted to a federal judge for assessment of whether it meets
the constitutional probable cause standard.
Once a federal judge authorizes a wiretap on a given phone, federal agents
work with the provider of phone service to intercept calls on the line. The Wiretap
Act requires that calls be "minimized," or continuously monitored in real time so
that monitoring of a particular transmission can be stopped once it is determined
to not relate to criminal activity (USA Bulletin, 1997). As a result, any time that a
call is recorded by law enforcement, agents must be available to simultaneously
listen to the call as it occurs. Minimization is designed to limit the invasion of
privacy that results from the interception. For wiretaps with conversations in
foreign languages, contract interpreters may be used. Agents act on the
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information generated by the wiretap to make arrests, seize contraband, or otherwise investigate and prevent criminal activity. Taps may be used at a variety of
stages in the investigation. If agents identify a phone early, a wiretap may be a
first step in the process. Alternatively, agents may be further along in an investigation before they consider a wiretap on a potential target phone.
The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, and the OEO statutory
scheme, are designed to act as checks on law enforcement, preventing police
from executing a warrant unless they can demonstrate a likelihood of recovering
evidence greater than probable cause. While the Supreme Court has declined to
provide a numeric definition for probable cause, it has suggested that it is a
relatively low standard, certainly requiring less than a 50o/o chance of recovering
evidence [Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975)]. McCauliff (1982) surveyed 166 federal judges on the numeric equivalent
of probable cause and found a mean reported level of 45.8o/o and a median of
50o/o. Some academics take a comparable view of the probable cause requirement (e.g., Bacigal, 2004; Duke, 1986; Kamisar, 1984), while others see judges as
rubber stamps for law enforcement, approving all applications presented to
them with little or no review (e.g., Wasserstrom and Seidman, 1988;
Schroeder, 1981; Saltzburg, 1980). We do not take a view on the exact numeric
definition of probable cause in the analysis below, but will use 50o/o probability
as a conservative reference point.
We describe these legal requirements in the following model that incorporates the decision of law enforcement of what devices to tap to elucidate the role
of the expected benefit to law enforcement, the cost of the tap, and the probable
cause standard. Similar models of law enforcement decision making have been
developed to model how racial bias might operate in the decision to search
when law enforcement wishes to maximize seizures (Knowles et al., 2001).
Modeling racial bias as a reduction in search costs, KPT predict that bias should
lead to searches of minorities being less successful than searches of majority
members. Using the model, they were unable to reject the hypothesis of no bias
in an examination of Maryland traffic stop searches. The KPT model has been
extended to incorporate a crime reduction objective for law enforcement
(Dominitz and Knowles, 2005) and imperfect monitoring (Persico and Todd,
2005). Significantly, these extensions, as well as the original KPT model, assume
that resource constraints are not binding (see Anwar and Fang, 2005;
Antonovics and Knight, 2004) and do not include data on the costs of specific
searches. Our model's results are driven by the constraints, with the core prediction that the probable cause standard, and thus the warranting process, will
only constrain law enforcement's behavior only if other constraints, such as
budget, do not bind first.
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1.1 Modeling the tap application decision
Let there be N possible tappable devices. A device is a triple {c;, b;,p;} where c;
represents the cost to law enforcement of tapping device i, b; represents the
benefit to law enforcement from tapping device i if it reveals evidence of illicit
activity,3 and p; is the objective probability that the device provides incriminating evidence. Each element in the device triple is drawn from known independent probability distributions, with F( c;) : [O, oo) ----+ [O, 1], G(b;) : [O, oo) ----+ [O, l],
and P(p;) : [O, 1] ----+ [O, 1]. When law enforcement encounters a device, it observes
{c;, b;,p;} and must decide whether to allocate c; from its total budget M to tap
device i.
This model assumes law enforcement takes the attributes of each device as
given, rather than endogenizing the probability of success on each tap with the
expenditures on it. This is based on the legal requirements surrounding wiretaps
that give law enforcement a strong sense of necessary costs, and little leeway to
improve the likelihood of success by investing more. Over 90o/o of the costs of a
wiretap come from staffing, largely because of the minimization requirements of
the Wiretap Act. Staffing cost varies primarily with the hours the device is
monitored and whether specialized translation is required. The hours of monitoring required depends on when the device is in use (e.g., business device taps
may only require monitoring during business hours) and is fixed and known at
the time the decision to pursue the tap is made. Similarly, whether specialized
language skills will require adding to the tap cost is known when the tapping
decision is made, and adding additional agents or inactive hours to the tap once
the minimum required monitoring is in place will have little effect on the
probability of recovering evidence. Federal agents and Department of Justice
officials have identified these high fixed costs as an important consideration in
determining whether to seek authorization to install a wiretap (USA Bulletin,
1997).

1.2 Homogenous costs and benefits
In the baseline model, we assume c; = C and b; = B are equal for all i. That is,
wiretaps only vary in their likelihood of recovering evidence. We examine
strategies wherein law enforcement determines cutoff value, r, of p; such that
3 We interpret the benefit to law enforcement from gathering incriminating evidence very

generally. As discussed in the regression analysis, we expect that law enforcement preferences
are based at least to some extent on the targeted crime.
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they tap devices if and only if p; ;::, r. For simplicity, we demonstrate the model
when the p;s are uniformly distributed.
Law enforcement seeks to solve the following problem:

l
J

max Il(r) = N /BdP(p)dp = NB
S.t.

M;::, N

(1T ,2)

T;::, p

r

CdP(p)dp = CN(l - r)

The objective function calculates the expected benefit for tapping each device
with p; ;::, r. The first constraint indicates that r must exceed p, the judicially
imposed probable cause standard. The second constraint captures the budget
constraint, where N(l - r) is the expected number of phones tapped at a cost of
C which cannot exceed the budget M. 4 If the probable cause constraint
is binding, then the Kuhn-Tucker conditions indicate r = p, that is law
enforcement will tap all phones with a probability of success greater than the
probable cause constraint. If, instead, the budget constraint is binding, then the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions give M = NC(l - r) and r = 1 - ffc .5
This result holds two important implications for interpreting empirical wiretap data. First, the average success rate of taps reflects the mean of the
conditional distribution of p; ;::, r, which does not capture the probable cause
standard in a nondegenerate distribution of p;s; rather, the probable cause
standard will only be reflected in the marginal wiretaps, those that are least
likely to yield incriminating evidence. Second, the probable cause standard will
be binding (and therefore observable) only if there is sufficient funding in law
enforcement to tap all phones with p; exceeding the probable cause standard.
Thus, to understand whether the warranting process constrains enforcement, it
is necessary to identify the success probabilities of the least likely taps installed,
and compare them with commonly accepted notions of the probable cause

4 Note that law enforcement differs from a firm in that they maximize benefits within a fixed,
exogenous budget; they do not gain from saving costs. This is consistent with theories of
bureaucracy and reflects the law enforcement objective of preventing crime that is bad for
society.
5 Both constraints would bind simultaneously in the event that the budget is exactly the
amount required to cover all wiretaps with p; 2: p; we dismiss this as occurring with probability
zero.
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standard. If the marginal taps are more successful than probable cause suggests,
some other factor is limiting law enforcement.

1.3 Heterogeneous costs and benefits
We next consider law enforcement's problem when b; ~ {{b1 , b2 , ... bn}, {¾}}
and C; ~ { { c1, c2, ... Cm},{¾;}}, each independently distributed. That is, law
enforcement observes a device in one of nm equally likely cost-benefit states
and in expectation, n~ of the potential devices is in each state. We can assume,
without loss of generality, that the costs and benefits are ordered by
their indices, i.e., b1 ~ b2 ~ · · · ~ bn and c1 ~ c2 ~ · · · ~ Cm. We examine strategies of the form that law enforcement selects r = {ru, r12, ... , r1m, r21, ... , 'nm},
a vector of probability thresholds for each cost-benefit type, to illustrate
how costs, benefits to law enforcement, and the probability with success
interact with the probable cause standard to determine which taps are
implemented.
Law enforcement chooses r in order to solve the following problem:

-L J pbj<lP(p)dp
1

max Il(r) = N
nm i,k

rik

s.t. 'ik ;::, p\/j, k

As in the homogeneous model, law enforcement collects benefit from each
tapped device in proportion to its probability of providing incriminating evidence, pays costs associated with the fraction of each type of device tapped, and
can only tap devices with probabilities exceeding the probable cause standard.
For uniformly distributed p;, the Lagrangian for this problem is
L = ~ [ Nb·
n~

(1 - 2k) +
-

1

r
2-

]

[

N ( ~ck(l - 'ik) ) ]
li,k('ik - p) +lM M - nm

Taking partial derivatives gives solutions for r
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This implies

In the polar case where the budget is sufficient to implement all taps for which
there is probable cause, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions imply AM = O and 'ik = p.
Since probable cause binds for all types of taps, all types can be used to draw
inferences about the empirical probable cause standard. In the polar case where
the budget is restrictive enough that the probable cause constraint is nonbinding
for all tap types, then the Kuhn-Tucker conditions imply lik = O\fj, k and we
have:
1

AM

= 'ikbj \-I'
k
v), .
Ck

That is, each 'ik is set in direct and fixed proportion to the corresponding cost
and benefit ratio. In the non-polar cases, where probable cause binds for some
tap types but the budget constraint binds for others, for any fixed bi, 'iv < 'iw
if w < v. That is, probable cause will bind for the low-cost type within each
benefit category before the high cost type, with rn 1 having the smallest r since by
construction, ~ is the largest benefit-cost ratio. For purposes of analyzing
empirical data on the effects of judicial review and probable cause on investigations, this model implies the p;s of the devices chosen for tapping depend also
on the benefit and cost to law enforcement. Empirical analyses must incorporate
data capturing and controlling for these values. Further, if cost-side variables
are empirically significant, it is likely the budget, rather than a judicial probable
cause standard, that is limiting the activity of law enforcement. This provides us
with guidance on specifying and interpreting an empirical model to test the
hypothesis that the warrant process limits law enforcement or that warrants
matter.

2 The data and statistical methodology
Section 2519 of the Wiretap Act requires that prosecutors and judges report
statistical data on their wiretaps every year to the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts (AO). The AO sends reminder letters to agents each year to
ensure timely and accurate reporting. Reported variables include information on
the application (e.g., district, judge, approval date), the target (type of device,
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crime), the tap implementation (place, nonmanpower costs, length of wiretap),
and the tap outcome (number of intercepted calls and individuals, number of
incriminating intercepts, number of arrests, trials and convictions as of the
report date). We use data on the 4,578 taps from 1997 to 2004 for which data
are available, updated to 2006 reporting to capture arrests and convictions that
may occur long after tap evidence is collected. 6
Before turning to a more sophisticated statistical analysis, a simple observation about the data suggests that law enforcement is self-imposing a standard
higher than probable cause: virtually all wiretap warrant applications are
approved. Between 1987 and 2007, federal and state law enforcement agencies
applied for 26,041 wiretaps, 26,034 of which were approved, a 99.97o/o approval
rate. Furthermore, if the binding constraint is the institutional OEO requirement
rather than a budgetary constraint, state wiretaps should be rejected more
frequently than federal wiretaps since state wiretaps do not require OEO
approval. While AOC only reports the total number of wiretaps sought by law
enforcement, without distinguishing between state and federal wiretaps, it does
report that, in that time period, 10,025 federal taps were approved and 16,009
state taps were authorized. If we assume all the rejected wiretaps were state
applications and all federal wiretaps were approved, state wiretaps still have a
99.96o/o approval rate.7
We seek to understand how wiretap success is influenced by factors that
affect judges (who implement the probable cause standard), prosecutors, law
enforcement officials, and the level of criminal activity. To do so, we use a
binary logit model to relate these factors to two measures of success for taps in
the federal wiretap database between 1997 and 2004. Here, we explain the
dependent and independent variables in the model.

2.1 Dependent variables
We choose two alternative dependent variables measuring whether a wiretap
succeeded, though neither choice is perfect. The Incriminating Intercept

6 Data are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/library/wiretap.html.

7 These figures may overstate the approval rate of the initial applications, as judges sometimes
are initially unconvinced by an application, instruct law enforcement to make a stronger case,
and then approve the wiretap. This phenomenon does not bias the data for our purposes, as
eventual approval indicates there is probable cause to initiate the tap - despite some initial
difficulty in documenting it - and it is the underlying probable cause that is relevant to our
study.
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dependent variable is coded as having a value of 1 if the wiretap is reported as
having at least one "incriminating intercept," and zero otherwise. 8 An incriminating intercept is a communication that the monitoring agent believes involves
criminal activity. In many ways, this is the correct measure of success for
purposes of understanding how the probable cause standard applied to wiretaps. A wiretap authorization is a statement by a judge that he believes that
there is probable cause that the device will be used in furtherance of a particular
illegal activity during the period of interception. Whether there is an incriminating intercept on the device during that period shows whether the ex ante
evaluation was correct. Over 92o/o of the wiretaps in the data set have at least
one incriminating intercept, a figure comparable to the reported success rates of
general search warrants discussed earlier. However, this measure may overstate
the number of successful wiretaps because it is subjective, and agents may have
an incentive to overstate the incriminating nature of calls to gain continuing
support of superiors, prosecutors, and judges.
Our second dependent variable is a more objective, but very conservative
measure of success. Arrests takes on the value 1 if the tap (or a related tap)
resulted in at least one arrest. 58.9o/o of taps are successful by this measure.
However, wiretaps sometimes fail to result in arrests for reasons independent of
the incriminating nature of the intercepted telephone calls. For instance, a
wiretap might not lead to an arrest if law enforcement cannot identify the parties
to a conversation. In addition, intercepts of low-level criminals may not lead to
arrests, as law enforcement allows monitored activity to continue in hopes of
identifying and arresting the leaders within a criminal organization.

2.2 Independent variables
We analyze the probability of success of individual wiretaps as a function
of measurable attributes of each wiretap. Table 1 provides the full list of

8 Law enforcement reports some taps as "related" to another primary wiretap, about 30% of

our data. For related wiretaps, separate arrest data are not included and for some related
wiretaps, cost data are also not reported. To generate the data for related wiretaps, we average
data for all related wiretaps. Specifically, arrests are averaged across all wiretaps related to the
same primary tap. As a result, if any tap related to the same primary tap has an arrest, all of the
taps in the group have at least a fractional arrest, meaning all taps will be coded as a success.
For wiretaps where cost is not separately reported, the cost information is also averaged for all
related taps on a per-day basis. In effect, this process means that all taps in a given "relatedness" group have the same average daily cost (although may differ in total cost since the length
of each tap varies). Our results are robust to the exclusion of secondary taps.
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independent variables included in the regression model, with summary statistics
for the variables. The explanatory variables fall into three basic categories,
corresponding to the three primary stories about what constraints law enforcement in the use of wiretaps: judicial variables, law-enforcement level variables,
and wiretap-specific variables. Judges can influence tap success by requiring a
high evidentiary standard, one that implies greater success rates than common
notions of probable cause, before approving tap applications. We include demographic attributes of the judges as potential explanatory variables for wiretap
success. 9
The characteristics of the United States Attorney's office for federal district
seeking the wiretap may affect tap costs and benefits, and we include law

Table 1: Independent variables with summary statistics.
Judicial characteristics

Wiretap-specific variables

Former Prosecutor (0.501)
Elite Law School (0.286)
Male (0.768)
Hispanic (0.072)
African-American (0.073)
Asian-American (0.013)
Log Length of Service (8.01/.929)

Log Average Daily Cost (7.06/1.08)
Log Length < 30 days (1.85/1.69)
Log Length > 30 days (1.97 /2.17)

Appointing President
George W. Bush (0.041)
Carter (0.127)
Clinton (0.336)
Eisenhower (0.001)
Ford (0.007)
Johnson (0.011)

Wiretap type/place
Pager (0.027)
Email (0.009)
Fax (0.006)
Microphone (0.024)
Cell Phone (0559)
Public Area (0.001)
Business (0.030)
Device (0.573)
Not Specified (0.001)
Other (0.011)
Roaming (0.003)

Wiretap year
1998 (0.114)
1999 (0.117)
2000 (0.115)
2001 (0.115)
2002 (0.120)
2003 (0.130)
2004 (0.175)
Targeted offense
Bribe (0.004)
Conspiracy (0.005)
Corrupt (0.002)
Extort (0.009)
Firearms (0.003)
Fraud (0.012)
(continued)

9 Demographic information for the judges signing the wiretap orders comes from the Federal
Judges Biographical Database, available at http://www.fjc.gov, the website of the Federal
Judicial Center. Recent surveys of the large literature suggest that the only characteristic of
judges that has a frequent, but not universal, statistically significant impact on case outcomes is
the party of the appointing president (Sisk, 1998; Pinello, 1999). However, the validity of the
party measure has been challenged and alternative measures have been proposed (Epstein,
2002; Sisk and Heisse, 2005), but the Epstein alternative measure is highly correlated with the
party of the appointing president.
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Table 1: (Continued)
Judicial characteristics

Wiretap-specific variables

Kennedy (0.000)

None (Pre-2000) (0.344)

Nixon (0.029)
Reagan (0.253)
Law enforcement variables
Murder Rate (0.000/0.000)
Recent Suppression (0.209)
Log Total Taps (4.54/1.00)

Wiretap initiation date
Late August (0.047)
Early September (0.033)
Late September (0.037)
Early October (0.037)
Late November (0.040)
Early December (0.028)
Late December (0.024)

Gamble (0.008)
Kidnap (0.002)
Murder (0.006)
Narcotics (0.841)
Other (0.009)
Racket (0.061)
Robbery (0.002)
Smuggle (0.005)
Terror (0.002)
Theft (0.003)

Early January (0.027)
Notes: Variable names in Roman type are binary variables; italicized variables are countable.
The numbers following the variable names represent the variable mean for binary variables and
the mean and standard deviation for countable variables. The mean and standard deviation are
from the 4,577 observations in the arrest data set. The incriminating intercept data set includes
slightly fewer (4,518) observations but the means and standard deviations for the smaller data
set are not significantly different. For the binary variables that span the dataset, i.e. appointing
president, year, wiretap type/place, and targeted offense, we have omitted, respectively,
George H.W. Bush, 1997, and Launder to avoid collinearity.
Former Prosecutor: For articles suggesting that former prosecutors impose a reduced probable
cause standard, see King (2005), Benner and Samarkos (2000), and Steinberg (1990).
Judicial race: Prior studies suggest that the race of judges generally does not affect case
outcomes. See Sisk and Hessse (2005).
Elite Law School: 1 = Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, New York University, Stanford, U.C.
Berkeley, U. Michigan, U. Pennsylvania, and Yale; O = otherwise. This list derives from a
1974 survey of law school deans asking them to list the top five law schools. These nine
schools appeared on at least 10% of lists. Blau and Margulies (1974-75).
Recent Suppression: 1

= wiretap suppressed in the district during past 3 years.

Murder Rate: annual murder rate per 100,000 residents in the year the tap is reported for
the municipality housing the primary United States Attorney's Office for the district, as reported
in the Uniform Crime Reports, Table 8, Offenses Known to Police in Cities over 10,000 in
Population, Crime in the United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation, available at http://
www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm. The problems with the UCR have been discussed extensively, but it
remains the only geographically disaggregated crime measure that is uniformly reported. For
discussions of the choice of the murder rate as a proxy for the general crime rate, see Donohue
(1998) and Cantor and Cohen (1980). For problems with the use of the UCR, see O'Brien (1985).
The primary alternative to the use of the UCR is victimization surveys. See Stuntz (1998).
Greater/Less than 30 days: The standard authorized initial length for a wiretap is 30 days; law
enforcement may apply for renewals for additional 30 day periods. Wiretaps lasting less than
30 days were shut down early due to an arrest or a lack of productivity while those lasting
longer than 30 days were renewed.
Wiretap Type/Place: The coding for place and type changed in 2000 and is not comparable to
the previous coding system.
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enforcement-level variables to capture this effect. In particular, we note that
federal wiretap usage varies considerably across the 94 Federal Districts, each
served by its own United States Attorney. As a result of differences in policy
priorities, as well as differences in population size, there is substantial variation
in wiretap usage: five Districts install just under one third of all federal wiretaps
in our data set (31.6o/o) and 11 Districts install almost half (49.7o/o).
Finally, variations in tap success could also reflect particular characteristics
of the wiretap in question and as a result, we include variables describing the
wiretaps themselves. The total cost of the wiretap is reported, and we divide by
the length of the tap and include the natural log of the average daily cost in the
model. We use average daily cost because the wiretap authorization process
requires law enforcement to consider tapping decisions in 30 day units: wiretaps
are initially authorized for a period of 30 days, with the requirement of renewal
for additional 30 day periods. 10 Since agents do not usually know at the time the
tap is authorized the number of renewals that will be needed, the decision is
made based on the cost of the average daily cost of necessary staffing for the
marginal 30 days.
To capture the benefits to law enforcement from a tap, we include the crime
under investigation. As many commentators have noted, the Fourth Amendment
probable cause standard is legally required to be transsubstantive: judges must
apply the same standard whether the crime at issue is serious or trivial (Lerner,
2003; Stuntz, 2001). However, our model implies a budget-constrained law
enforcement imposes substantive criteria in their decision to seek a tap and
police and prosecutors select which cases to investigate and prosecute, and the
seriousness of the crime is one factor that law enforcement considers in its
analysis. We note, though, that the crimes under investigation are expressed
at a high level of generality and cases often involve overlapping criminal
activities, e.g., narcotics investigations often involve allegations of murder and
other violent acts.

3 Regression results
To test the hypothesis that warrants limit law enforcement activities, we model
wiretap success as a function of the independent variables using a district-level
10 Taps are required to be monitored if there is an outstanding warrant, and while they can be

shut down early to save monitoring costs, the data suggest this rarely happens. 54.8% of taps
are for exactly 30 days, while an additional 28.0% are renewed once, to exactly 60 days. Only
0.05% of taps are not a multiple of 30 days in length.
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random effects logit model. Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients and
standard errors for both regression models. The models fit well (hit rates of
64.?o/o for arrests and 95.So/o for intercepts) and are highly significant (Wald
statistics of 338 (65 dot) and 656 (59 dot) for intercepts).

Table 2: Random effects logit regression results grouped by district.

Variable

Law Enf. Var.
Murder Rate
Recent Suppression
Total Taps
Average Daily Cost
Greater than 30 days
Less than 30 days

Arrest Coeff.

Std. Err. Sig.

239.275
0.172
-0.213
0.266
0.132
0.230

622.985
0.098
0.053
0.033
0.179
0.141

Offense Type
Bribe
Conspiracy
Corrupt
Extort
Firearms
Fraud
Gamble
Kidnap
Murder
Narcotics
Other
Racket
Robbery
Smuggle
Terror
Theft

0.780
1.056
-0.186
-0.300
-1.445
0.132
-0.366
0.122
-0.153
0.105
0.260
-0.636
0.695
0.109
-0.061
0.259

0.596
0.582
0.735
0.390
0.654
0.373
0.419
0.836
0.465
0.209
0.406
0.243
0.748
0.523
0.841
0.666

Judge Type
Former Prosecutor
Elite Law School
Male
Hispanic
African-American
Asian-American
Length of Service

0.043
-0.043
0.063
-0.116
0.109
0.229
0.174

0.077
0.085
0.088
0.143
0.134
0.297
0.085

Appointing President
George W. Bush
Carter

0.163
-0.293

0.302
0.160

***
***

**

***

**

lncrim.
Int. Coeff.

Std. Err. Sig

748.228
-0.307
-0.305
0.610
0.211
0.728

983.881
0.221
0.134
0.068
0.435
0.346

-1.183
-1.154
18.065
-0.677
20.013
-0.513
20.540
-2.680
-2.891
-1.086
22.615
-1.412
-2.091
20.347
-3.707
21.273

1.352
1.435
55,182.990
1.335
40,572.190
1.172
38,445.210
1.246
1.072
0.834
71,848.470
0.889
1.391
57,759.700
1.180
58,442.350

**
***
**

**
***

***

-0.129
0.180
-0.151
0.194
-0.086
0.209
-0.324
0.303
0.032
0.321
21.911 36,459.450
0.155
0.166
0.200
-0.263

0.617
0.362
(continued)
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Table 2: (Continued)
Variable

Clinton
Eisenhower
Ford
Johnson
Kennedy
Nixon
Reagan

Arrest Coeff.

Std. Err. Sig.

0.054
0.130
0.828
1.176
0.031
0.456
-0.200
0.334
-23.847 48,553.060
-0.548
0.239
-0.167
0.117

**

lncrim.
Int. Coeff.

Std. Err. Sig

0.202
0.292
21.735 86,148.830
-0.622
0.877
-1.074
0.582
18.860 74,757.610
0.228
0.581
-0.014
0.277

Wiretap Type/Place

None (Pre-2000)
Business
Public Area
Device
Other
Roving
Not Specified
Cell Phone
Microphone
Pager
Email
Fax

-2.350
-0.187
0.897
-0.321
-0.769
-0.222
-0.730
0.661
-0.367
0.468
0.514
0.275

1.009
0.245
0.969
0.407
0.422
0.615
1.217
0.381
0.315
0.313
0.420
0.447

-0.197
-0.154
-0.246
-0.091
-0.184
0.370
0.135
0.532

0.153
0.182
0.170
0.174
0.165
0.206
0.212
0.216

-0.026
-0.015
-2.520
-2.514
-2.959
-3.137
-3.309

0.141
0.143
1.020
1.030
1.033
1.045
1.051

**

-1.011
0.499
0.170
0.755
21.483 71,167.550
-0.915
1.027
-0.022
0.847
21.010 65,667.210
21.232 79,749.630
0.113
0.916
-1.998
0.757
0.132
0.745
-0.937
0.950
-0.605
1.394

Initiation date

Late August
Early September
Late September
Early October
Late November
Early December
Late December
Early January

**
**

Year reported

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
N

Log likelihood
Hit rate
Mean square dev.

4,577
-2,826.013
0.647
1,999.295

0.167
1.083
0.371
0.024
-0.194
0.111
-0.897
-0.459

0.393
0.730
0.460
0.413
0.373
0.498
0.404**
0.440

Secondary
-0.019

0.209

4,518
Log likelihood
Hit rate
Mean square dev.

-636.477
0.958
331.149

**
**
***
***
***

**

***
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Only Log Average Daily Cost and Log Total Taps in the district are significant
in both models, meaning higher cost taps and taps in districts that do fewer
taps are more likely to succeed. Crime rates, suppression activity, the offense
sought, and judge characteristics are not systematically significant contributors to tap success. This result strongly suggests that budget constraints lead
law enforcement to pursue only wiretaps that satisfy the probable cause
standard.
The results are presented in three steps. Section 3.1 compares the empirical
probability of success of the marginal tap to accepted statistical notions of
probable cause. Section 3.2 argues the cost and benefit variables affect tap
success in the way the model in Section 1 predicts if the budget constraint is
binding. Section 3.3 presents ancillary support for the primary result, arising
from two policy changes.

3.1 Success of the marginal wiretap
Before interpreting the effects, or lack thereof, of specific variables, we
turn back to the question of whether the warrant process limits law enforcement. As the theoretical model of Section 1 suggests, the first step is to
identify the marginal wiretaps. The empirical model of Section 2 relates the
costs and benefits (independent variables) to the probability of success (the
dependent variable). Since the theoretical model shows that for each costbenefit ratio, there is a minimum acceptable success probability that will
justify pursuing a tap, we can look at the taps with the lowest probability of
success in the empirical model-overall and in each district-and interpret
these as marginal, conditioned on observed costs and benefits, from the
perspective of their appeal to law enforcement. If a large number of these
taps have predicted success probabilities comparable to common probabilistic notions of judicially imposed probable cause standards, we infer that our
sample is censored in that there are extramarginal taps that offered sufficient
expected benefit to law enforcement but were not pursued due to judicial
restraint; if the marginal taps have consistently higher probabilities of success than probable cause, we infer something internal to law enforcement
constrained pursuit of extramarginal taps that would have met the judicial
standard.
Figure 1 presents cumulative distributions of the success probabilities
predicted by our models. The thick solid lines indicate the distribution of
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individual taps. These distributions strongly suggest that the probable cause
standard is not a binding constraint. Virtually all wiretaps have a greater
than SOo/o chance of recovering a dirty communication. Only ten of the 4,578
wiretaps have predicted probabilities less than our conservative SOo/o probable cause benchmark; 99o/o of taps have probabilities above 65o/o; and nearly
9 in 10 have predicted probabilities above 90o/o. Even on the overly restrictive
arrest measure, over 80o/o of wiretaps have a better than probable cause
chance of ending in an arrest. Thus, if probable cause binds, it does so in
very few cases.

-

All Intercepts
All Arrests
Int. Low by Dist.
Arr. Low by Dist.
------ Int. 2nd by Dist
Arr. 2nd by Dist

0 +'------,,------.-----T"----.---T-------,r------r----T"----.----1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0
Proportion of taps/districts
Figure 1: Distribution of predicted success probabilities.

The thin dotted lines in Figure 1 indicate the distribution across districts of
the predicted probability the least likely to succeed tap in the district; the
dashed line is the distribution of the second least probable tap in the district.
Since federal districts are semi-autonomous and vary substantially in their
prosecutorial priorities and wiretap usage, it is possible the probable cause
standard binds in some districts but not others. Approximately 90o/o of
federal districts did not install a single wiretap with a less than SOo/o chance
of recovering an incriminating communication during the time period
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captured in our data set, and only one (the Central District of California)
installed two such taps. By the conservative arrest measure, slightly more
than 60o/o of districts installed at least one tap with a less than 50o/o chance
of success, and nearly half installed two such taps. However, many of these
low probability arrest taps are for crimes, such as racketeering, where arrests
were quite difficult. In the vast majority of districts, it appears even the most
marginal wiretaps installed are not constrained by the probable cause
standard.
That the probable cause standard is not binding suggests that the judicial factors that could cause variation in the standard applied will not affect
case outcomes, and in fact none of the judge demographics is significant in
both models. That the overwhleming success of taps across districts does not
vary with crime rates suggests the prevalence of crime is not the reason for
taps' success. The coefficient on district Murder Rate is insignificant in both
models (p = 0.701 in Arrests and p = 0.447 in Intercepts), contrary to Duke's
(1986) argument that high crime rates are the source of high search warrant
recovery rates. 11 This is not surprising, since for wiretaps to succeed over
90o/o of the time, criminal activity would have to be rampant for indiscriminately pursued wiretaps to succeed. However, surveys suggest that even
personal use of narcotics, a crime far more common than those targeted by
federal wiretaps, is relatively infrequent, with less than lOo/o of Americans
report drug use in the last 30 days. 12 Random roadblocks yield evidence of
drug crimes 4. 74o/o of the time [Indianapolis v. Edmonds, 531 U.S. 32, 34-35
(2000)].

3.2 Costs and benefits
If neither probable cause nor high levels of criminal activity explain the high
success rates of even marginal wiretaps, some other constraint must limit law
enforcement's activity. Our formal model suggests that the costs and benefits
to law enforcement may be the determining factor and in this section, we
turn to variables that capture those costs and benefits.

If other measures of the crime rate, such as the uniform crime rate index, or the violent crime
rate index, are used instead of the murder rate, the coefficient remains insignificant in both
models. We chose the murder rate because murders are among the least underreported crime.
12 See http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t388.pdf for figures relating to survey evidence.
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3.2.1 Wiretap costs and benefits

The Average Daily Cost13 is the only independent variable is statistically significant at the 99o/o level for both measures of success. 14 More expensive taps are
more likely to succeed (p < 10- 15 in both models). Cost is not only statistically
significant, but actually results in legally important changes in the probability of
success. The predicted probability of success for an average tap (at the sample
mean of all variables) is 63.2o/o for the arrest measure and 99.4o/o for the intercept
measure. Increasing the average daily cost by $1,000, from the mean value of
$1,159, increases the arrest success rate to 67.0o/o and the intercept success rate
to 99.6o/o.
This statistical result can be interpreted in two ways, with different implications for wiretap policy. First, if tap costs are exogenous, this means a tap that is
$1,000 per day more expensive must be almost 4 percentage points more likely
to yield an arrest to be pursued by law enforcement. Alternatively, costs may be
endogenous, and thus law enforcement can choose to "try harder" by spending
$1,000 more per day on a given tap, and this additional effort yields a 4 percentage point increase the probability of arrest. In addition to our a priori argument
that it is difficult to try harder on a given tap presented in Section 1.1, the data
support our assumption that costs are exogenous, and thus that our formal
model correctly characterizes law enforcement behavior in the presence of a
binding budget constraint.
First, if law enforcement could increase success rates by spending more, we
would expect to see higher expenditures on more serious crimes, those that
provide more benefit to law enforcement. However, a median test comparing
expenditures by targeted offense indicates that costs are not higher for more
serious crimes, as only smuggling (p < 10- 3) and kidnapping (p = 0.026) have
significantly higher median expenditures, and racketeering lower (p = 0.008),
than the sample overall. Instead, Table 2 indicates that law enforcement is
willing to accept lower probabilities of success on crimes that offer greater
benefit: wiretaps aimed at the serious or imminent crimes of Terrorism
(p = 0.002), Kidnapping (p = 0.031), and Murder (p = 0.007) are strongly
13 The explanatory variable used in the regression is the natural log of the average daily cost.

The results are robust to using average daily cost itself.
14 There are several cases where an independent variable is perfectly predictive, resulting a

coefficient with a high absolute value and a very large standard error. All taps for Corruption,
Firearms, Gambling, Other, Smuggling and Theft resulted in incriminating intercepts, as did all
Public Area, Roving and Unspedfied place taps. All taps approved by Asian-American judges or
judges appointed by Eisenhower or Kennedy revealed incriminating information, but none of the

taps approved by the Kennedy judges resulted in arrests (hence the large negative coefficient).
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significant and negative on the incriminating intercepts measure - which may
help prevent crimes - but are no different on the arrest measure
(p = 0.942, 0.884 and 0.742, respectively). 15 Variables for Organized Crime,
Racketeer and Firearms are negatively significant in the Arrests model
(p = 0.009 and 0.027, respectively), but Racketeer is insignificant in Intercepts
(p = 0.112) and Firearms is positive and perfectly predictive, indicating wiretaps
aimed at racketeering and firearms are at least as likely as other taps to intercept
incriminating communications, but substantially less likely to lead to arrests.
This may reflect the difficulty of proving violations of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which requires evidence on a wide range
of elements.
Second, budget constraints are apparent in the effect of the number of taps
each district installs. Wiretap use varies widely across the 94 federal districts.
The coefficient of Log Total Taps is significantly negative in both models
(p < 10- 4 in Arrests and p = 0.023 in Intercepts), indicating that districts that
do more taps are less successful on average. If costs were endogenous, this
result might arise because districts with more taps spread their budget and
spend less on each tap, making them less successful. However, a quantile
regression 16 of each district's average tap cost against the number of taps in
the data set finds the effect of total taps is economically negligible ($1.50 less
Average Daily Cost per unit increase in District Total Taps) and statistically
insignificant (p = 0.184); districts that do more taps spend the same on each
tap as those that do fewer. Thus, districts are taking tap costs as given, and
those that conduct only a few taps select those likely to yield incriminating
evidence and lead to arrest; those that do more taps add cases where gathering
evidence is less certain. The most active districts in the data set have approximately 400 wiretaps, reducing the predicted success rates of their average tap to
55.8o/o and 99.lo/o, compared to average rates of 63.2o/o for the arrest measure and
99.3o/o for the intercept measure.
Taken together, these results indicate that law enforcement is considers the
exogenous costs and benefits from each tap and chooses to pursue those taps
that maximize the benefits it receives within its budget, consistent with our
formal model.

15 These data provide relatively little direct insight into international terrorism policy, most of
which is investigated through classified programs rather than traditional criminal investigation.
The data set included only 4 terrorism wiretaps from before 9/11 and 8 after.
16 Quantile regression is preferable because the data are highly heteroskedastic and means are
heavily influenced by a small number of outliers.
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3.2.2 Beyond the probable cause requirement

Two other results support our conclusion that internal law enforcement
dynamics are the effective constraint on traditional criminal wiretaps. First,
the enabling statues and precedents provide a natural experiment on the effective value of the wiretap warrant: evidence stemming from wiretaps on spoken
word devices that are later determined to be in appropriate can be excluded
from court cases, but evidence recovered from electronic devices (email, pager
and fax) cannot. 17 If fear of later suppression, meaning an assessment by a trial
judge that the original probable cause finding was incorrect, constrained tapping decisions, then we would expect electronic wiretaps to succeed at lower
rates; law enforcement should be more willing to pursue marginal electronic
taps, and judges should be more willing to approve them, knowing that even if a
later judge disagrees that probable cause was satisfied, recovered evidence can
still be used in court proceedings.We include indicator variables for the device
tapped (Cell Phone, Microphone, Device, Email and Fax: l = named device is
targeted in tap application; O = named device is not target of tap) to capture
this effect. Our results do not find that electronic taps, reflected in the Pager
(p = 0.135 in Arrests and 0.860 in Intercepts), Email (p = 0.221 in Arrests and
0.324 in Intercepts) and Fax (p = 0.538 in Arrests and 0.664 in Intercepts)
variables, are significantly less likely to be successful than the baseline of
landline telephone taps. Further, Recent Suppression is insignificant (p = 0.079
in Arrests and 0.165 in Intercepts), indicating that even for taps with a suppression remedy, districts that have experienced one do not change their tapping
activity. Our model predicts such invariance to the probable cause standard
when probable cause is not binding.

17 The original 1968 Wiretap Act supplemented the Constitutional suppression remedy with a
statutory suppression remedy for violations of the Act. The original Act only covered the
interception of "wire or oral" communications and when Congress amended the Act in 1986,
expanding coverage to electronic communications, they did not expand the statutory suppression remedy, a decision subject to academic criticism (e.g., Kerr, 2003a, 2003b; Leib, 1997). The
Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the good faith exception in Leon applies to the
statutory suppression remedy, but the Department of Justice has taken the view in
Congressional testimony that it does not (Gorelick, 1995). As a result, electronic wiretaps appear
to be free from the suppression remedy that applies to those intercepting oral communications.
Studies show that, for ordinary search warrants, the exclusionary rule increases police attention
to the details of Fourth Amendment law, but concern for the rule does not have much effect on
police decision making in contemplating a search (e.g., Slobogin, 1999; Perrin, 1997; Spiotta,
1973; Atkins and Rubin, 2003).
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The second result that corroborates our interpretation that budget limits law
enforcement is the insignificance of the Roving tap type (p = 0.718 in Arrests;
perfectly predictive in Intercepts). Roving wiretaps waive the requirement that a
particular telephone number be specified in the application, allowing the investigators to switch devices without prior judicial approval, when the target can be shown
to be changing phones to thwart the investigation. Iflegal requirements matter, we
might expect that roving wiretaps have success rates different from traditional taps.
Allowing roving wiretaps were one of the most controversial elements of the 2001
amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), one that proponents argue is a key element of anti terrorist investigations. 18 While the FISA wiretaps
lie outside the scope of our data, the lack of a statistically significant coefficient in
the regression analysis for the roving wiretap indicator variable suggests that, at
least for traditional criminal wiretaps, the differing legal standard does not affect
success rates, consistent with legal constraints not being binding. 19
Of all the variables associated with the wiretap initiation and installation
process that could lead to the paradoxically high success rates for wiretaps, only
those associated with budget are systematically significant. Our results suggest
that law enforcement considers their budget and the cost of the wiretap in
deciding whether or not to implement a tap. This self-censoring by law enforcement is a dominant effect in the high success rate for wiretaps.

4 Discussion: the role of warrants
This analysis establishes that it is internal law enforcement dynamics driven by
budget constraints, rather than the judicial probable cause standard, that limits
law enforcement's investigative wiretapping activity. First, because the success
rate of even marginal taps exceed that widely associated with the probable
cause threshold, warrants are unlikely to be the constraint limiting wiretap
use. Second, the relationships between a wiretap's success rate and its cost,
the target crime, and the district-wide wiretap usage rates in the relevant district
imply that budget constraints drive wiretap success rates. Further, both the
structure of the tap process and the data relating tap cost to success suggest

18 For an extensive discussion of the differences between roving wiretaps under FISA and the

Wiretap Act, see Perrine (2005). As Kerr (2003) points out, it is surprising that the coverage of
roving wiretaps and the Patriot Act failed to mention that they had been authorized by statute
for 15 years prior to its passage.
19 This result should be viewed with caution. Comparable data for whether a wiretap is roving
is only available since 2000. In our data set, only 16 roving wiretaps were authorized.
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that law enfrocement takes tap costs and benefits as given, rather than endogenously determining success probabiliities, and choose to pursue those taps
that yield the greatest benefit within their budget. Because they are expensive,
law enforcement does not systematically seek wiretaps that would come close to
failing judicial review for the constitutional probable cause standard.
It should not be concluded from this that judicial review should be eliminated. It still provides important checks against bad agents or agents with
personal agendas that more than zero warrant applications were rejected suggests it still has a role.
However, that marginal taps are bound by budget constraints implies that
there are taps that would satisfy the probable cause standard that are not being
pursued. If the probable cause standard reflects a policy judgment of when a
wiretap is socially desirable, i.e., society wants law enforcement to seek a wiretap
whenever there is probable cause to believe a device is being used for illegal
activity, these results suggest that budget limitations have substantially overdeterred wiretap usage and law enforcement is not seeking socially desirable
traditional wiretaps. One policy option is increasing budgets, the another is
reducing costs. As discussed above, the primary source of the high costs of
wiretaps is the minimization requirement: agents must contemporaneously listen
to and record calls to ascertain whether the content is criminal. If agents could
record calls and review them later, staffing costs would fall dramatically, and
enable law enforcement to conduct more socially desirable taps. Minimization, of
course, has substantial social benefits, including ensuring that private, non-criminal transmissions are never recorded and hence never leaked. This analysis
suggests, though, that the minimization requirement, rather than the probable
cause requirement, is the binding legal constraint on law enforcement behavior.
These results provide guidance for analyzing current programs, such as the
Terrorist Surveillance Program, where both a warranting and minimization
requirement are subject to policy debate. Whether warrants would matter
turns largely on the program's funding and cost structure. If the funding and
costs are the same as for traditional wiretaps, warrants will not matter much budget limitations will restrict the use of these wiretaps to situations where
probable cause could be easily demonstrated. If, on the other hand, these
wiretaps are either sufficiently well-funded that law enforcement has the
resources to seek out marginal wiretaps, or if the wiretaps are not subject to
the minimization requirement, a warrant requirement would provide a restriction at the margin. While we do not know detailed information about the
classified program, we do have aggregate data on the number of wiretaps
being installed under FISA compared to those installed by traditional federal
law enforcement. The combined total number of FISA wiretaps and search
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warrants (in unknown proportion) is higher than the number of traditional
wiretaps and has nearly doubled recently to be more than twice as large as
the traditional wiretapping program. 20 Given that our results reflect a strong
"less is more" effect for wiretap use, this increase in FISA wiretap use suggests
that the antiterrorist program may be sufficiently funded that it can conduct
many socially desirable taps, but as a consequence it may be pursuing taps that
fail to meet the probable cause standard.
Further research is also useful to provide a comparative perspective on wiretap
use. The legal constraints on wiretap use vary considerably by country. Notably, in
many European countries, wiretaps are used substantially more often with far less
oversight. For example, despite a substantially smaller population, the United
Kingdom authorizes more wiretaps than the United States and does so without
any judicial involvement (Singleton, 2008). Assuming the costs of wiretaps are
comparable across countries, our results suggest that the higher usage of wiretaps
indicate that they are likely to be less productive than in the American setting.

5 Data appendix (for reviewers)
As discussed in the text, law enforcement is required to report wiretap results to
the AOC. In turn, the AOC reports the data to the public. The initial report is filed
the year that the wiretap is initially disclosed and subsequent reports are filed as
events warrant. Most frequently, these events are additional arrests, trials, and
convictions that occur in years after the wiretap is initially disclosed. The data set
shows evidence that some initial reports are missing data and some supplementary reports are not filed as required by law. The data set includes 106 wiretaps
leading to arrests that list a zero or blank entry for incriminating intercepts. (44 of
these wiretaps are related to another wiretap and, as a result, their arrest result is
inferred by the process discussed in the main text.) It is difficult to understand
these data as anything other than a reporting error. Furthermore, 242 (4.97o/o)
wiretaps report a greater number of convictions than arrests, also suggesting a
reporting error. In addition to these wiretaps suggesting that some arrests are not
being reported, there is reason to believe that convictions are underreported as
well. The overall conviction rate in federal court is roughly 90o/o (including both
guilty pleas and convictions after trial). The wiretap data set, though, includes
only 11,134 convictions on 25,545 arrests, a 43.6o/o conviction rate. While some
convictions for the most recent wiretaps may not have occurred yet, even the pre2002 wiretaps show only a 49.4o/o conviction rate.
20 See http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html.
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Table 3: Error rates by district.

District

Total

Total wiretaps

Error

wiretaps

with excess arrests

rate

5
17

2

0.4

W.D. Tenn.

6

0.35

M.D. La.
M.D. Tenn.

10
18

0.3
0.22

N.D. Iowa

S.D. Ala.

9

3
4
2

S.D. Miss.
S.D. Iowa

9
5

2
1

0.22
0.2

94
21

18

0.19

37

4
7

0.19
0.19

E.D. Tenn.
E.D. Ky.

34
12

6
2

0.18
0.17

W.D. Okla.

30
17
27

4
2

0.13

E.D. Ark.
W.D. La.
N.D. Ala.

18

3
2

W.D. Ark.

10

1

D. Conn.
D. S.C.
S.D. Ind.

0.22

0.12
0.11
0.11
0.1

For purposes of our analysis, these errors do not affect our results unless they
incorrectly list zero incriminating intercepts or arrests. For the logit regression,
mere underreporting does not alter the outcome. 65 wiretaps report no arrests
but include at least one conviction. We code these wiretaps as arrest successes
despite the reported zero result. We follow the same process for the 62 unrelated
wiretaps showing arrests but no incriminating intercepts, but do not alter the
incriminating intercepts results for the 44 related wiretaps. Unlike arrests,
incriminating intercepts are reported separately for related wiretaps. Because
we are inducing the arrest success, we believe that these missing incriminating
intercept successes could be correct. These corrections do not change our central
conclusions? the regression returns similar results when run on an uncorrected
data set.
These data provide the side benefit of allowing us to measure the error rate by
district, identifying which districts are most likely to fail to file reports. A full analysis
of the data set along these lines is beyond the scope of this article but Table 3 includes
initial summary data. It reflects the districts with at least lOo/o of their wiretaps
reporting more convictions than arrests, described as "excess arrests" in the Table.
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